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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consent is the Philosophers' Stonel of the law: it can transmute an 
unconstitutional search into a lawful one, a criminal act into a legal 
one, or a tort into a contract. As technology has evolved, so has this 
fundamental legal concept. New forms of communication call for new 
ways to obtain and manifest consent. Examples include shrink-wrap 
licenses,2 click-to-accept licenses,3 faxed signatures,4 e-mails,5 and e-
signatures.s Each of these forms, however, requires some affirmative 
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW. 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Faculty, The Johns 
Hopkins University. I would like to thank my research assistants, Lisa Paganini 
and Lisa Morgan, for their tireless efforts in search of the obscure. 
1. "A reputed solid substance or preparation supposed by the alchemists to possess 
the property of changing other metals into gold or silver, the discovery of which 
was the supreme object of alchemy.~ 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 686 
(R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed. 1989). 
2. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
3. See, e.g., Home Basket Co. v. Pampered Chef, Ltd., No. 04-1314-WEB, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 513, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2005). 
4. See, e.g., Patterson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Crown Foods Int'l, Inc., 307 F.3d 666 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
5. See, e.g., Lamie v. Mattei, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
6. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 2.33(d) (2005); TRADEMARK MANuAL OF EXAMINING PRocE-
DURE §§ 304.08, 804.05 (3d ed. 2003). 
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action by the person sought to be bound. An emerging issue is 
whether permissions granted by a computer program can constitute 
consent on behalf of the computer's owner, particularly where the per-
missions are set by default in the distributed form of the program 
rather than by a conscious decision by the owner to set them. 
On November 8, 2005, the Boston Globe reported that Computer 
Associates International had concluded that Sony BMG was distribut-
ing music compact discs which contained not only the music that pur-
chasers wanted, but also code which would run on the purchaser's 
computer, collect information about the purchaser, and report that in-
formation back to Sony.7 On November 18, 2005 (following Microsoft's 
decision to classify the Sony program as spyware and provide tools to 
remove it),s Sony recalled the CDs and offered to replace those that 
had already been sold.9 
On December 29, 2005, the New York Times reported that the Na-
tional Security Agency had used cookies in transactions on its web-
siteiO in violation of agency guidelines which had been in place since 
at least as early as 1999.11 On January 6, 2006, CNET reported that 
7. Hiawatha Bray, Security Firm: Sony CDs Secretly Install Spyware, BosTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2005, at Dl. 
8. Id. 
9. See Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Important Legal Notice/Software Update 
Notice, http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). On December 4, 
2005, Sony issued an apology. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, To Our Valued 
Customers (Dec. 4, 2005), http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/customerletter.html. 
10. Associated Press, Spy Agency Removes Illegal Tracking Files, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2005, at A16. 
11. Office of Management and Budget, Guidance and Model Language for Federal 
Web Site Privacy Policies (June 1, 1999), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memo-
randa/m99-18attach.html. 
Later, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed restrictions on at 
least "persistent" cookies. Agencies were prohibited from using such cookies un-
less approved by the agency head upon a showing of a "compelling need to gather 
data" and "clear and conspicuous notice." Letter from John T. Spotilla, Adm'r, 
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Roger Baker, Chief Info. Officer (Sept. 5, 
2000), available at http://www .whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cookies_letter90500. 
html. The policy provides the following: 
1. Tracking technology prohibitions: 
a. agencies are prohibited from using persistent cookies or any other 
means (e.g., web beacons) to track visitors' activity on the Internet 
except as provided in subsection (b) below; 
b. agency heads may approve, or may authorize the heads of sub-
agencies or senior official(s) reporting directly to the agency head 
to approve, the use of persistent tracking technology for a compel-
ling need. When used, agency's [sic) must post clear notice in the 
agency's privacy policy of: 
• the nature of the information collected; 
• the purpose and use for the information; 
• whether and to whom the information will be disclosed; and 
• the privacy safeguards applied to the information collected. 
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"[s]ixty-six politicians in the U.S. Senate and House of Representa-
tives are setting permanent Web cookies even though at least 23 of 
them have promised not to use the online tracking technique."12 
These are clear examples, and probably isolated instances, of viola-
tions of computer users' rights. There are, however, widespread uses 
of similar technology that pose significantly more far-reaching issues. 
Cookies are files stored on a user's computer (the client) on instruc-
tion from a second computer (the server) when the client's web 
browser software (browser) communicates with the server's website. 
These files typically contain encrypted information relating to the 
transaction between the client and server. By default, current brows-
ers "accept cookies," that is, they allow the server to write these files 
to the client and to store them for a period of time determined by the 
server. Since the data in the file is under the control of the server, it 
can be used to record and monitor the transactions between the client 
and server. If the server has appropriate decrypting capability, it can 
also monitor transactions between the client and other servers. The 
use of cookies without consent of the user raises a number of issues: 
• First, does the use of cookies constitute a trespass on the client 
computer? 
• Second, when the server is controlled by a private party, does its 
use of cookies constitute unauthorized access to a computer in vio-
lation of criminal law? 
• Third, when the server is controlled by a government agency, does 
its use of cookies constitute (in addition to the above violation of 
c. agencies must report the use of persistent tracking technologies as 
authorized for use by subsection b. above (see section VII). 
2. The following technologies are not prohibited: 
a. Technology that is used to facilitate a visitor's activity within a 
single session (e.g., a "session cookie") and does not persist over 
time is not subject to the prohibition on the use of tracking 
technology. 
b. Customization technology (to customize a website at the visitor's 
request) if approved by the agency head or designee for use (see 
v.l.b above) and where the following is posted in the Agency's Pri-
vacy Policy: 
• the purpose of the tracking (i.e., customization of the site); 
• that accepting the customizing feature is voluntary; 
• that declining the feature still permits the individual to use the 
site; and 
• the privacy safeguards in place for handling the information 
collected. 
c. Agency use of password access to information that does not involve 
"persistent cookies" or similar technology. 
Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Executive 
Dep'ts & Agencies (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
memorandalm03-22.html. 
12. Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Congress' Hands Caught in the Cookie Jar, 
CNET NEws.coM, Jan. 6, 2006, available at http://news.com.com/Congress+ 
hands+caught+in +the+cookie+jar/2100-1028_3-6020711.html. 
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rights) an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
or an unlawful seizure of property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment? 
• And fourth, if the use of cookies without permission violates crimi-
nal law, individual constitutional rights, or other rights, is there 
potential secondary liability for the providers of the browser 
software under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in 
MGM v. Grokster?13 
Technically, a browser will not accept a cookie from a website un-
less its permissions have been set to do so. Does this technical an-
swer-cookies are used only when permission has been given in a 
technical sense-equate to "consent" in the legal sense sufficient to 
authorize the transaction and insulate the setter of the cookie from 
the above types of liability? 
If the answer is "no," then websites which set cookies are at risk for 
civil and criminal liability, government websites which set cookies fur-
ther risk violating constitutional rights, and the distributors of web 
browsers face potential secondary liability for the use of their 
products. 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
A cookie14 is a text file embedded in an HTTP file exchanged be-
tween a server and a web browser running on a client, and it is re-
trievable by the server.15 When a user browses a webpage, the 
website sends an image of the webpage as an HTML file using HTTP. 
If the user's computer is set to allow cookies, the webpage may embed 
a cookie in the HTML file, and the cookie is then stored on the user's 
computer. When the user next contacts the website, the user's com-
puter sends a request for an HTML file and the cookie is embedded in 
the request. In this fashion, a website can track information relating 
to prior transactions with the user's computer. This process is re-
ferred to as "setting'' a cookie. The server site sets the cookie, which 
typically contains client information, on the client computer, from 
13. Metro-Goldwyn·Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
14. Although they will be referred to herein as "cookies," typical Internet cookies are 
more precisely "HTTP Cookies," so called because they are text embedded in 
HTTP files, the principal engine of Internet web page exchanges. 
15. Wikipedia, HTTP cookie, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!HTTP_Cookie (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006); see also, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 806b app. (2005) (defining a cookie as 
"[d)ata created by a Web server that is stored on a user's computer either tempo-
rarily for that session only or permanently on the hard disk (persistent cookie). It 
provides a way for the Web site to identify users and keep track of their prefer-
ences. It is commonly used to 'maintain the state' of the session. A third-party 
cookie either originates on or is sent to a Web site different from the one you are 
currently viewing."). 
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which the server can retrieve it during a web browsing session.1s 
Cookies are useful in streamlining transactions by reducing the need 
for repeated transfer of redundant information in exchanges between 
clients and servers over the Internet. Cookies can store data so that a 
server can be provided with information about the client's settings, 
past browsing history, authentication, or preferences without the 
user's needing to reenter the data; cookies can encode information so 
that only a small coded file needs to be transferred in order to convey 
larger amounts ofinformation.17 A common use of cookies is to main-
tain a shopping basket on a commercial website-the user can provide 
authenticating information and a credit card number once during a 
session, sequentially select items for purchase, and then execute a sin-
gle purchase instruction.1s The resulting efficiency is especially im-
16. The cookie is embedded in the HTML files which are exchanged between the cli-
ent and server during a browsing session. The server embeds the cookie in the 
HTML file sent to the client, and when the client communicates with the server 
(for example, to request a webpage), it embeds the cookie in the communication. 
17. For example, if a client prefers the server to display in yellow twelve-point Times 
New Roman font on a blue background, this can be encoded as preference "A" and 
stored in a cookie on the client computer. When the client logs on to the server, 
the server only needs to retrieve "A," then look up its meaning in the server's own 
database, rather than transfer "yellow twelve-point Times New Roman font on a 
blue background." Because internal lookups are significantly faster than 
equivalent Internet data transfers, this reduces total transaction time. Further-
more, if either party is paying for bandwidth based on the number of bits trans-
ferred, this will reduce the cost as well. 
18. In In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003), the 
court stated: "[C]ookies often store user preferences, login and registration infor-
mation, or information related to an online 'shopping cart.' Cookies may also con-
tain unique identifiers that allow a website to differentiate among users." 
However, it is also possible to collect personal information: "The following per-
sonal information was found on Pharmatrak servers: names, addresses, tele-
phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders, insurance statuses, 
education levels, occupations, medical conditions, medications, and reasons for 
visiting the particular website." Id. at 15. For another example, see U.S. Patent 
No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1999), where the patent's abstract describes the 
invention as follows: 
A method and system for placing an order to purchase an item via the 
Internet. The order is placed by a purchaser at a client system and re-
ceived by a server system. The server system receives purchaser infor-
mation including identification of the purchaser, payment information, 
and shipment information from the client system. The server system 
then assigns a client identifier to the client system and associates the 
assigned client identifier with the received purchaser information. The 
server system sends to the client system the assigned client identifier 
and an HTML document identifying the item and including an order 
button. The client system receives and stores the assigned client identi-
fier and receives and displays the HTML document. In response to the 
selection of the order button, the client system sends to the server sys-
tem a request to purchase the identified item. The server system re-
ceives the request and combines the purchaser information associated 
with the client identifier of the client system to generate an order to 
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portant when bandwidth is a limiting factor, as for example when 
retrieving large files over modem connections. The cookie may be 
stored in the client's random access memory (RAM) (in which case it 
disappears when the client computer is turned off, the user's browser 
is closed, or, at the server's option, when the transaction with the 
browser ends), or it may (again, at the server's option) be stored on the 
client's hard drive (in which case the duration of the cookie is deter-
mined by the server).19 A cookie which is stored in RAM or erased 
from the client's hard drive at the end of the transaction is referred to 
as a "temporary" or "session" cookie; a cookie which remains on the 
hard drive after the session is closed is referred to as a "persistent" 
cookie.2o 
In addition to cookies set and retrieved by the server from which 
the client has requested a webpage, third-party cookies may be set 
and retrieved. For example, a server may provide information to an 
advertising website21 advising of the client's interests (as evidenced 
by the webpages the client has requested) so as to enable the advertis-
ing website to select targeted advertising to be presented to the 
client.22 
Theoretically, the ability of a server to set a cookie is controlled by 
the user. All common browsers have settings which allow the user to 
block (at the user's option) some or all cookies. However, the default 
setting is to allow cookies; browsers do not conspicuously advise users 
that cookies are being accepted, and the process for changing the de-
fault settings requires sufficient sophistication to navigate through 
purchase the item in accordance with the billing and shipment informa· 
tion whereby the purchaser effects the ordering of the product by selec-
tion of the order button. 
19. Of course, the same information could be stored on the server, which has implica-
tions for analysis of trespass and unauthorized access. See infra section IV.A. For 
such a system to work, the client user would need to log in so that the appropriate 
data could be matched to the client. There are at least three reasons website 
operators might prefer to store the information on the client computer: obviously, 
it uses client resources rather than server resources; the information can be 
shared with other servers; and, at least with current technology, there is no need 
to request user cooperation. 
20. These definitions can be found in Microsoft's Internet Explorer under "Help"/ 
"Contents and Index"/"cookies"/"types of cookies." 
21. E.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D. Mass. 2002). 
22. Third-party advertising may be incorporated in the page requested by the client 
as a banner, or may be sent as a pop-up or pop-under ad. Third-party cookies 
present special issues with respect to client consent in connection with trespass 
and criminal liability. See infra section IV.A. They also present special issues of 
aggregation, similar to those presented by government cookies. See infra section 
rv.c. 
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several layers of commands.23 The most ubiquitous browser running 
under the Windows operating system, Microsoft's Internet Explorer, 
defaults to allow all cookies and provides user control under the 
"Tools"/"Internet Options"/"Privacy" menu, where the user can select 
levels of privacy which restrict the ability of selected servers to set 
cookies-hardly a straightforward process for many users. The 
Mozilla-based browsers24 provide greater user control25 but still re-
quire navigation,26 and are set to allow all cookies by default.27 
The server's website may be designed to refuse access to a client if 
the client's browser is set so that cookies are not allowed. Assuming 
that the owner of the server is under no obligation to provide access,28 
using this power does not run afoul of the law. If the user's browser is 
set to reject cookies and the server's website is set to refuse access 
where cookies are disabled, the user will need to make a conscious 
decision whether access to the site is worth the price of allowing cook-
23. The index to the Windows XP basic guide does not even list "cookies," although it 
does list "HTML" and "HTTP." The "Help" file for the current version oflnternet 
Explorer provides the following information under "Cookies"!" About Cookies": 
Understanding cookies 
Some Web sites store information in a small text file on your com-
puter. This file is called a cookie. 
There are several types of cookies, and you can choose whether to 
allow some, none, or all of them to be saved on your computer. If you do 
not allow cookies at all, you may not be able to view some Web sites or 
take advantage of customization features (such as local news and 
weather, or stock quotes). 
Conspicuously absent in the top-level summary is any suggestion that the 
"small text file" may contain a user's personal information, or why a user might 
want to "choose ... to allow some, none, or all of them." Those details are pro-
vided under the "How cookies are used" subindex of "Cookies" I" About Cookies." 
Some third-party websites provide instructions for controlling cookies on major 
browsers. See, e.g., Junkbusters, How Web Servers' Cookies Threaten Your Pri-
vacy, http://www.junkbusters.com/cookies.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (provid-
ing instructions on "[h]ow to disable cookies"). 
24. Mozilla-based browsers include Mozilla Firefox and Netscape 6, as well as earlier 
browsers. 
25. For example, cookies can be forced to expire when the browser is closed. 
26. The commands are located in the "Tools"/"Options"/"Privacy"/"Cookies" subfolder 
of the Mozilla Firefox browser. 
27. See, for example, the Mozilla Firefox browser's "Help" menu under "Managing 
Cookies"/"Setting Up Cookie Rules." 
28. There are circumstances in which the server owner may be under such an obliga-
tion. Two examples are paid subscription services and services supported by 
grants conditioned on public access. Unless the relevant contract allows the 
owner of the server to condition access on the client's acceptance of cookies, denial 
of access would be a breach of contract (and, of course, the contract could not be 
used to demonstrate authorization so as to avoid criminal liability). Government 
websites present a special case with additional issues. See infra section IV.C. At 
least with respect to criminal statutes, the dual requirements of intent and lack 
of consent may be sufficient to protect the server owner who reasonably, but mis-
takenly, relies on the competence of the user. 
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ies. If a legally competent user makes the decision to accept cookies, 
there is neither violation of the law nor cause for complaint.29 
III. THE NATURE OF CONSENT 
The definition of consent is contextual. In a general sense, consent 
is defined as "[a)greement, approval, or permission as to some act or 
purpose."30 Express consent is "[c]onsent that is clearly and unmis-
takably stated,"31 while implied consent is "[c]onsent inferred from 
one's conduct rather than from one's direct expression."32 The exis-
tence of consent in a particular case is a question of fact and may be 
inferred from actions. Mass marketers have faced the problem of ob-
taining consent in wholesale contexts and have developed techniques 
for obtaining consent without retail negotiations of consent.33 
In the tort context, 
[c]onsent means that the person concerned is in fact willing for the conduct of 
another to occur. Normally this willingness is manifested directly to the other 
by words or acts that are intended to indicate that it exists. It need not, how-
ever, be manifested by words or by affirmative action. It may equally be man-
ifested by silence or inaction, if the circumstances or other evidence indicates 
that the silence or inaction is intended to give consent. Even without a mani-
festation, consent may be proved by any competent evidence to exist in fact, 
and when so proved, it is as effective as if manifested.34 
The consequence of consent is that "[o]ne who effectively consents to 
conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in 
an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it."35 
In the criminal context, a victim cannot consent to a crime since 
the victim cannot waive the right of the state to prosecute. However, a 
victim's consent may convert what would otherwise be a criminal act 
into a legal act. For example, it is ordinarily criminal to attack a per-
son with a knife; even if two people agreed to settle a disagreement 
with a knife fight, that agreement would not prevent prosecution of 
both parties for criminal assault and battery. However, a patient may 
agree to surgery, converting what would otherwise be a criminal act 
into a lawful one. 
In the context of constitutional protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure, consent means permission granted provided "a 
29. The special case of acceptance by users who are not legally competent presents 
other issues relating to both primary liability, see infra notes 192-94 and accom-
panying text, and secondary liability, see infra section IV.D. 
30. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004). 
31. !d. 
32. Id. 
33. For example, mass marketers of software have developed solutions for shrink 
wrap licenses and "click-to-accept" agreements. See supra notes 2-3 and accom-
panying text. 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. b (1979). 
35. !d. § 892A. 
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reasonable person would feel free to decline the ... requests or other-
wise terminate the encounter."36 
Consent has numerous potential effects with respect to cookies. 
Consent can insulate against civil liability for trespass, invasion of 
privacy, or battery;37 it can insulate against criminal liability for tres-
pass, wiretapping, or unauthorized access to computers; and it can le-
gitimize a governmental search and seizure. There is, however, a 
possible perceptual disconnect between the parties to a cookie transac-
tion. The party setting the cookie knows that the cookie may not be 
set unless the recipient's computer gives permission to do so, but the 
recipient may not know how the computer is configured. Although 
consent may be implied from actions, there must be a reasonable be-
lief that the action is meant to convey consent. as Under the current 
state of user sophistication, it does not appear that the action of ac-
cepting cookies carries the necessary implication of consent in the ab-
sence of specific, conspicuous notice. 
IV. ABSENCE OF CONSENT: THE RISKS 
A. Trespass to Chattel 
Placing information on a third party's computer without authoriza-
tion may constitute a trespass to chattel.39 A trespass to chattel is 
"intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or 
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."40 Even ac-
cidental harm suffices to impose liability,41 and the degree ofinterfer-
36. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). 
37. Of particular interest in this context is the following: 
Exceeding privilege. If the actor exceeds the consent given, the consent 
does not protect him from liability for the excess. When, as is normally 
the case, the harm caused by the excess is severable from that resulting 
from the privileged act, the actor is subject to liability only for the excess. 
Thus if there is consent to an entry on land for a proper purpose and the 
actor enters for that purpose and subsequently commits an unpermitted 
tort upon the premises, he becomes liable for the subsequent tort but not 
for the original entry. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. h (1979). 
38. ld. § 892 cmt. b. 
39. The cases to date fall into two main categories: those where the unwanted infor-
mation was transmitted (for example, unsolicited e-mail), see infra notes 45, 57 
and accompanying text, and those where the information was appropriated (for 
example, by web crawlers), see infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). Comment e defines "intermed-
dling'' as "intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel." 
41. While intent is an element of the offense, 
an intention is present when an act is done for the purpose of using or 
otherwise intermeddling with a chattel or with knowledge that such an 
intermeddling will, to a substantial certainty, result from the act. It is 
not necessary that the actor should know or have reason to know that 
such intermeddling is a violation of the possessory rights of another. 
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ence need not be great.42 While consent is a defense, exceeding the 
scope of authorization vitiates that consent. 43 The development of 
trespass theory has followed scientific developments in interpreting 
what can constitute a physical invasion, and it now encompasses elec-
tronic invasion.44 
In Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,45 one of the earliest 
electronic trespass cases, Compuserve sold Internet and e-mail access 
to subscribers, and Cyber Promotions sent mass, unsolicited e-mail 
advertising46 to Compuserve's subscribers. Compuserve produced evi-
dence of subscribers' complaining and threatening to cancel their sub-
scriptions.47 In response to the complaints, Compuserve established 
screens to block e-mails from Cyber Promotions' address, but Cyber 
Promotions circumvented the screens by falsifYing the "sender" infor-
mation in its e-mails.48 The district court enjoined all Cyber Promo-
tions' e-mails to Compuserve customers as a trespass, finding that the 
transmission of electronic signals to Compuserve's customers (and, 
thus, Compuserve's computers) satisfied the physical contact require-
ment49 and that the resulting demand for disk space and processing 
power reduced the availability of resources for Compuserve's subscrib-
ers and diminished the value ofCompuserve's equipment.50 The court 
rejected the argument that, by making its service available to the gen-
eral public, Compuserve consented to any and all e-mailers, although 
the court required that there be notice that such mass mailings were 
not permitted. 51 Because technological advances have outpaced judi-
Thus, it is immaterial that the actor intermeddles with the chattel under 
a mistake of law or fact which has led him to believe that he is the pos-
sessor of it or that the possessor has consented to his dealing with it. 
ld. cmt. c. 
42. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (granting a preliminary injunction and finding a trespass where evidence 
(on summary motions) showed that the unwanted access to eBay's computers rep-
resented between 1.11% and 1.53% of the total load on its listing servers, though 
the evidence failed to show that expenses were incrementally incurred because of 
the trespass, or that any particular service disruption could be attributed to the 
activities). 
43. Id. at 1070. 
44. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996). 
45. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
46. This is now called "spam." 
47. Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1019. 
48. ld. 
49. ld. at 1021. 
50. Id. at 1028. 
51. Id. at 1024; accord Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); 
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting 
injunctions against unsolicited mass e-mail, upon showing of electronic transmis-
sion to plaintiff's computer, resulting in impairment of condition, quality or 
value). 
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cial resolution of the issue of the degree of interference required in 
order to constitute trespass, the question remains unresolved. 
In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,52 Bidder's Edge used an auto-
mated process to repeatedly access eBay's auction website to collect 
data on the status of its auctions. 53 Although the eBay website was 
open to, and invited, the public, Bidder's Edge accessed the site 
100,000 times per day.54 The court held that this level of access ex-
ceeded the authorization granted to the public to access the website 
and therefore found the lack of consent necessary to constitute a tres-
pass. 55 The court found the necessary element of interference with 
property in Bidder's Edge's use of eBay's computer system capacity, 
depriving eBay "of the ability to use that portion of its personal prop-
erty for its own purposes."56 
The mere transmission of electronic signals was held insufficient to 
establish trespass, however, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.57 There, 
Hamidi, a former Intel employee, used Intel's computer system by 
sending several mass e-mailings critical of management to between 
8,000 and 35,000 Intel employees58 contrary to Intel's guidelines for 
computer use. Intel testified that some employees found the messages 
unwelcome, and that its technical staff spent time and effort attempt-
ing to block them; the former employee admitted using multiple com-
puters in an effort to circumvent the employer's efforts to block the e-
mails.59 The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' 
decision to uphold an injunction against continued trespass to chattel, 
finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated no damage or threat 
of damage to the computer system, and holding that trespass did not 
cover electronic communication that "neither damages the recipient 
computer system nor impairs its functioning."Go The court distin-
guished spamming cases, where it perceived that large quantities of e-
mail might overburden a computer system, and interpreted the hold-
ing in eBay as consistent with its view, since the eBay court, though 
commenting that "[e]ven if ... its searches use only a small amount of 
eBay's computer system capacity, [Bidder's Edge] has nonetheless de-
prived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property 
52. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
53. ''Programs that recursively query other computers over the Internet in order to 
obtain a significant amount of information are referred to ... by various names, 
including software robots, robots, spiders and web crawlers." Id. at 1060 n.2. 
54. Id. at 1063. 
55. Id. at 1070. 
56. Id. at 1071. 
57. 71 P.3d 296, 309-10 (Cal. 2003). 
58. Id. at 323 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
59. Id. at 301 (majority opinion). 
60. Id. at 300. 
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for its own purposes,"61 nevertheless went on to find "that the defen-
dant's conduct, if widely replicated, would likely impair the function-
ing of the plaintiffs system."62 In this way, eBay had shown potential 
injury.63 
That was not the case in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,64 
however. Ticketmaster and Tickets.com each sold tickets to events 
and maintained websites to provide information as to location, date, 
time, description of the event, and ticket prices. Tickets.com at-
tempted to list all events for which tickets were available. It obtained 
information about competitors' tickets by using a program called a 
"spider" or "crawler" to review their websites and extract the informa-
tion. When Tickets.com did not have tickets available for sale, it 
linked to a website that did. One of the linked sites was Tick-
etmaster's. Ticketmaster filed suit alleging breach of contract, copy-
right infringement, and trespass. Disagreeing with other district 
court holdings that no harm need be shown in order to establish an 
electronic trespass, Senior Judge Hupp found that the use of Tick-
etmaster's resources was "very small" and that there was "no showing 
that the use interfere[d] to any extent with [Ticketmaster's] regular 
business."65 Observing that "scholars and practitioners alike have 
. criticized the extension of the trespass to chattels doctrine to the in-
ternet context, noting that this doctrinal expansion threatens basic in-
ternet functions (i.e., search engines) and exposes the flaws inherent 
in applying doctrines based in real and tangible property to cyber-
space,"66 the court held that the mere use of a spider to enter a pub-
licly available website to gather information, without more, was 
insufficient to fulfill the harm requirement for trespass to chattel67 
and dismissed Tickmaster's trespass claims. 
In Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc.,6B the plaintiff 
sued a competitor that had accessed its computer system, asserting a 
61. Id. at 306 (quoting eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. No. CV-99-7654-HLHVBKX, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 
2003). 
65. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV-99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12987, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000). 
66. Ticketmaster, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *11 (citing Laura Quilter, 
Cyberlaw: Regulating Conduct on the Internet: The Continuing Expansion of 
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421 (2002); R. Clifton 
Merrell, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WAsH. U. L.Q. 675 
(2002); Mary Anne Bendotoff & Elizabeth R. Gosse, "Stay Off My Cyberproperty!": 
Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, INTELL. PRoP. L. BuLL., Spring 2001, at 12; 
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1275, 
1283--84 (2002)). 
67. Id. at *13. 
68. No. C-00-0724JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22520 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001). 
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variety of federal and state causes of action, including trespass. The 
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment in which 
the defendant asserted that its access did not constitute trespass, even 
though the plaintiff had conceded that the access had "placed a 'negli-
gible' load on [the plaintiff's] computer system.G9 The court noted the 
conflicting approaches of the eBay and Ticketmaster courts: 
While the eBay decision could be read to require an interference that was 
more than negligible (as did the court in Ticketmaster), this Court concludes 
that eBay, in fact, imposes no such requirement. Ultimately, the court in that 
case concluded that the defendant's conduct was sufficient to establish a cause 
of action for trespass not because the interference was "substantial" but sim-
ply because the defendant's conduct amounted to "use" of Plaintiff's com-
puter .... [That court relied on language saying that) a plaintiff can sustain 
an action for trespass to chattels, as opposed to an action for conversion, with-
out showing a substantial interference with its right to possession of that 
chattel. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss Oyster's trespass claim on 
the grounds that Oyster has shewn only a minimal interference because Oys-
ter has presented evidence of "use" .... 70 
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,n Register.com sought to enjoin 
Verio from using an automated process to monitor Register.com's In-
ternet domain name registry in order to compile a customer list, al-
though Register.com had no published policy prohibiting such activity 
and could not provide proof of quantifiable damage from the activity. 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant the 
injunction as within that court's discretion, relying on the finding that 
Verio's use of search robots "consumed a significant portion of the ca-
pacity of Register's computer systems" and that "[w]hile Verio's robots 
alone would not incapacitate Register's systems, the [lower] court 
found that if Verio were permitted to continue," a more significant 
trespass was ''highly probable."72 
Thus, courts73 appear to reach conclusions which can be reconciled 
only by attempting to quantify "impact" on computer resources, an in-
herently ambiguous concept. An impact which might be imperceptible 
at one instant could be catastrophic at another. An impact which 
69. Id. at *39-40. 
70. Id. at *40-41 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
71. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
72. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004). 
73. In the interest of completeness, it should also be noted that state trespass claims 
may be appended to federal claims under statutes such as the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
enacted and amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Courts are reluctant to 
retain jurisdiction over such state claims if the federal claim is dismissed. For 
example, in In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D. 
Mass. 2002), a state trespass claim was included in an ECPA case. Although 
reversed on appeal in In re Pharmatrack, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (reversing the holding as to violation of the ECPA), the trial court dis-
missed the federal claims and declined to retain jurisdiction of the state trespass 
claims. See also cases cited infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
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might be imperceptible to a machine with a state-of-the-art processor 
and a large hard drive connected to a Tl connection might be cata-
strophic to a machine with a slower processor, a smaller hard drive, 
and a dial-up connection. The problem for companies communicating 
through the Internet is that they are not likely to know in advance 
which configuration is on the receiving end of the communication. 
B. Criminal Liability for Unauthorized Access 
The typical American website does not provide conspicuous notice 
that it sets cookies. Generally, notice is only provided if cookies have 
been turned off and the site needs them in order to function, i.e., in 
situations in which the user already has actual knowledge of cookies 
and has made the decision not to allow them. In contrast, the Euro-
pean Union requires websites to advise users if the sites use cookies 
and permit users to reject them.74 
Federal criminal statutes in the United States also prohibit certain 
types of activities with respect to computers. The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act75 prohibits "exceeding authorized access"76 to a com-
puter, which means "to access a computer with authorization and to 
use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the 
accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter."77 The Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act78 prohibits intentional interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications.79 It also prohibits intentional un-
authorized access to a facility through which an electronic information 
service is provided, or "intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization to 
access that facility" and obtaining access to an electronic communica-
tion "while it is in electronic storage."so The CFAA and the ECPA 
both create private causes of action.s1 
74. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Recital 25 & art. 5(3), Conceming the Processing 
of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications 
Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 
37, 39, 44 (EC). 
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). Jurisdictionally, the plaintiff must show at least $5,000 
in damages. Id. § 1030(e)(8). 
76. Id. § 1030(a)(l). Similarly, § 1030(a), subsections (2) and (4), prohibit activity 
that "exceeds authorized access." 
77. Id. § 1030(e)(6). 
78. Pub. L. No. 99-190, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as enacted and amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S. C.) 
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
80. Id. § 2701(a). Although apparently redundant, subsection (c) provides an excep-
tion for conduct authorized by the person to whom the communication was 
directed. 
81. See id. §§ 2520, 2707. 
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Most states also have statutes which prohibit unauthorized access 
to computers.s2 The term "unauthorized access" presents an issue of 
interpretation. Access without authorization is clearly covered. It is 
less clear whether the term covers the situation where there is author-
ity for initial access for certain purposes but not for subsequent use of 
that access beyond the originally intended purposes, or where there is 
arguably implied consent to access but no specific grant of access. 
Both issues are directly relevant to the analysis of the use of cookies. 
Arizona,sa Georgia,s4 Hawaii,85 Maryland,BG Michigan,s7 New 
Mexico,ss North Dakota,s9 Ohio,90 and South Carolina91 explicitly 
82. Alabama: ALA. ConE § 13A-8-102 (Supp. 2004); Arizona: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-2316(A) (2001); Arkansas: ARK. ConE ANN § 5-41-104 (1997); id. §§ 5-41-
202(a)(1), 5-41-203(b)(1) (Supp. 2005); Colorado: CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 
(2005); Connecticut: CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-251 (2001); Delaware: DEL. ConE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (2001); Florida: FLA. STAT ANN.§ 815.06 (West 2006); Georgia: 
GA. ConE ANN. § 16-9-153 (Supp. 2005); Hawaii: HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 708-890, 
708-895.5(1) (Supp. 2005); Idaho: IDAHO ConE ANN.§ 18-2202 (2004); Illinois: 720 
ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3 (West 2003); Iowa: IowA ConE ANN. §§ 714.1(8), 
716.6B (West Supp. 2006); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(d) (Supp. 2005); 
Maryland: Mo. ConE ANN., CRIM. LAw§ 7-302 (LexisNexis 2005); Massachusetts: 
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, § 120F (West 2000); Michigan: MICH. CoMP. LAws 
ANN.§ 752.795 (West 2004); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.89 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2006); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); Ne-
braska: NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1347 (Reissue 1995); Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. 
§ 205.4765 (2003); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 638:17 (LexisNexis 
1996 & Supp. 2005); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-25 (West Supp. 2005); 
New Mexico: N.M. STAT.§ 30-45-5 (2004); New York: N.Y. PENAL LAw§§ 156.05, 
156.10 (2006); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (2003); North Dakota: 
N.D. CENT. ConE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (Supp. 2005); Ohio: OHIO REv. ConE ANN. 
§§ 2913.04(B), 2913.421(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1953(A)(4) (West 2002); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. § 164.377(4) 
(2003); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7611, 7613 (West Supp. 2005); 
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws§ 11-52-3 (2002); South Carolina: S.C. ConE ANN. 
§§ 16-16-10, 16-16-20(1) (Supp. 2004); Tennessee: TENN. ConE ANN. § 39-14-
602(b) (2003); Utah: UTAH ConE ANN.§ 76-6-703 (2003 & Supp. 2005); Washing-
ton: WASH. REv. ConE ANN.§ 9A.52.120 (West 2000); West Virginia: W.VA. ConE 
ANN. § 61-3C-5 (West 2005) (computer services); id. § 61-3C-11 (obtaining confi-
dential public information); id. § 61-3C-12 (computer invasion of privacy); Wis-
consin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.70(2) (West 2005); and Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6-3-504 (2005). It does not appear that the District of Columbia, Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, Ver-
mont or Virginia have specific statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to 
computers. 
83. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A) (2001). 
84. GA. ConE ANN. §§ 16-9-92, 16-9-93(b)(3) (Supp. 2005). 
85. HAw. REv. STATS. §§ 708-890, 708-895.5 to -895.7 (Supp. 2005). 
86. Mo. ConE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2005). 
87. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 752.795 (West 2004). 
88. N.M. STAT. § 30-45-5 (2004). 
89. N.D. CENT. ConE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (Supp. 2005). 
90. OHIO REv. ConE ANN. §§ 2913.04(B), 2913.421(D)(l) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005). 
91. S.C. ConE ANN. §§ 16-16-10, 16-16-20(1) (Supp. 2004) (subject to damages). 
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prohibit access to a computer exceeding that authorized by the client 
computer's owner. Oklahoma92 and Kansas93 prohibit access exceed-
ing that authorized by the owner when coupled with resulting 
damage. 
Maryland's statute94 is typical of those prohibiting exceeding au-
thorized access, and its history illustrates the definitional problem. It 
currently defines "access" to a computer as follows: "'Access' means to 
instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data 
from, or otherwise use the resources of a computer program, computer 
system, or computer network."95 The statute prohibits intentional un-
authorized access: "A person may not intentionally, willfully and with-
out authorization access ... or exceed the person's authorized access 
to all or part of a computer network ... [or] computer .... "96 
In any web transaction, there is no question that the server ac-
cesses the client computer-that is the point of the web transaction.97 
The more difficult question is whether the access is unauthorized. 
Again, there seems little room to argue that the superficial transac-
tion between the client and server-the transfer from the server to the 
client of the information actually requested by the user-is unautho-
rized. The superficial transaction is knowingly initiated by the user.98 
If the user is given notice and understands that part of the transaction 
will involve the collection and storage of information about the trans-
action on the user's computer, it would be difficult to argue that the 
use of cookies constitutes unauthorized access. However, as noted 
above, current browsers default to allow cookies and therefore do not 
provide notice that they will be stored on the user's computer. Never-
theless, under standard contract principles, formal notice would be 
92. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953(3) (West 2002). 
93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(b)(3), (d) (2005). 
94. Mo. CoDE ANN., CRrM. LAw § 7-302(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (originally enacted as 
Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 146(a) (1984)). 
95. ld. § 7-302 (a)(2) (derived from former Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 146(a)(9), which 
was substantially the same, providing: "'Access' means to instruct, communicate 
with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of equipment in-
cluding, but not limited to, computers and other data processing equipment or 
resources connected therewith."). 
96. ld. § 7-302(c). 
97. Although the transaction is initiated by the client with a request for information 
(such as an HTML page) from the server, the server must also retrieve informa-
tion from the client in order to fulfill the request. 
98. Certain transactions are arguably not "knowingly" initiated by the user (i.e., so-
called pop-up or pop-under ads). These are triggered by actions which the user 
has taken, but are not specifically requested by the user. For an example, see 
"What are Popups?" in Mozilla Firefox under "Help"f'Help Contents"t'Controlling 
Popups." Current versions of browsers provide user control over pop-up and pop-
under ads, although they require the same type of navigation as the controls of 
cookies. The special problems of pop-up and pop-under ads are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
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unnecessary if the user were aware of the use of cookies and accepted 
a benefit with such knowledge.99 At this point, the available data 
does not support such a position. 
In 2000, Business Week conducted a survey on Internet privacy,10o 
asking, "If you use a computer, have you ever heard of an online tech-
nology known as 'cookies'?" Sixty percent of the respondents an-
swered "no." Of those respondents who had heard of cookies, seventy-
five percent correctly identified their function. In other words, only 
thirty percent of respondents knew what a cookie does. When advised 
that some websites track user movements online, thirty-five percent of 
those who claimed to use the Internet responded that they would be 
"not at all comfortable," and twenty-eight percent would be "not very 
comfortable" with such websites even if the site did not tie their online 
activity to their name or real-world identity. The numbers went to 
sixty-eight and twenty-one percent, respectively, when the question 
included linking browsing habits into a profile linked to the user's real 
name and identity, and to eighty-two and thirteen percent, respec-
tively, when additional personal information such as income, driver's 
license, credit data, and medical status was added to the profile. Even 
without the link to identifying information or additional personal in-
formation, sixty-seven percent of respondents were "not at all comfort-
able" with sharing information that would allow tracking on multiple 
websites, while twenty-four percent were "not very comfortable." The 
message would appear to be that there is not sufficient awareness to 
find implied consent to the use of cookies simply by virtue of use of the 
web. A large majority of users would in fact object to the use of cookies 
if made aware of them. 
The argument still might be made that by initiating a transaction 
with a website, the user has implicitly authorized whatever might fa-
cilitate that (or a similar future) transaction. That argument, how-
ever, would need to overcome the principle that consent given under a 
mistaken understanding of the transaction is ineffective.lOl Further-
more, the development of modern criminal statutes regarding unau-
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 69(1) (1981) ("Where an offeree fails 
to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in the fol-
lowing cases only: (a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with 
reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered 
with the expectation of compensation .... "). A similar argument could be made to 
support government use of cookies, since widespread knowledge of the use of 
cookies would defeat an expectation of privacy with respect to information stored 
in cookies. 
100. Harris Interactive, Business Week/ Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, Bus. WK., 
Mar. 20, 2000, http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_121b3673010.htm. The 
data was collected by a telephone survey of 1,014 adults between March 2 and 
March 6, 2000, by Harris Interactive. The raw data collected from the survey 
(concerning cookies) is found infra in the appendix. 
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 892B (1979). The provision provides: 
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thorized access suggests a trend toward prohibition not only of 
unauthorized access, but also of access exceeding initial authority. 
The evolution of the Maryland statute is instructive on this critical 
question of authorized access, and particularly on the question of 
whether a user's grant of access for one purpose is sufficient authori-
zation to cover all subsequent activities. As originally enacted, the 
statute provided that 
(2) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization ac-
cess, attempt to access, or cause access to a computer, computer network, ... 
[or] computer system, ... to: ... (ii) Alter, damage, or destroy data or a com-
puter program stored, maintained, or produced by . . . any part of these 
systems ... _102 
In Briggs v. State, 103 a criminal defendant, Terry Briggs, was a 
computer programmer, hired as the system administrator of the Scar-
borough Group's network. His duties included management of the en-
tire system. Thus, his access to the computers clearly was authorized. 
Following a dispute, however, Briggs resigned. Scarborough then dis-
covered that some of its files had been password protected,104 and that 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), consent to conduct of another is 
effective for all consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any 
interests resulting from it. (2) If the person consenting to the conduct of 
another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the 
nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be 
expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by 
the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unex-
pected invasion or harm. 
102. Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 146(c) (1996 & Supp. 1997). The full text of the statute 
provided as follows: 
(c) Illegal access.-(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and 
without authorization access, attempt to access, or cause access to a com-
puter, computer network, computer software, computer control lan-
guage, computer system, computer services, computer data base, or any 
part of these systems or services. 
(2) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization 
access, attempt to access, or cause access to a computer, computer net-
work, computer software, computer control language, computer system, 
computer services, computer data base, or any part of these systems or 
services to: 
(i) Cause the malfunction or interrupt the operation of a computer, 
computer network, computer software, computer control language, com-
puter system, computer services, computer data base, or any part of 
these systems or services; or 
(ii) Alter, damage, or destroy data or a computer program stored, 
maintained, or produced by a computer, computer network, computer 
system, computer services, computer database, or any part of these sys-
tems or services. 
(3) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization: 
(i) IdentifY or attempt to identifY any valid access codes; or 
(ii) Distribute or publicize any valid access codes to any unauthorized 
person. 
103. 704 A.2d. 904 (Md. 1998). 
104. Briggs admitted having placed the passwords. ld. at 906. 
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only Briggs had the password, which Briggs had "difficulty remember-
ing."l05 Briggs was charged with, among other things, unauthorized 
access to a computer under article 27, section 146.106 The State's the-
ory was that "although Briggs was authorized to access the computer 
system, he was not authorized to access the system in such a way as to 
interrupt the operation of ... the system."l07 The trial court denied a 
motion for judgment of acquittal and a jury convicted on the charges of 
unauthorized access.l08 On appeal,l09 Briggs argued that he had 
been granted access to Scarborough's computer system and that the 
statute did not cover "conduct that can be characterized as only ex-
ceeding authorized access."no The purpose of the statute, Briggs ar-
gued, "was to deter unauthorized users from breaking into computer 
systems."lll 
While it was disputed whether Briggs had been authorized to place 
passwords on files, the court found it unnecessary to resolve that dis-
pute, holding it sufficient for reversal of the conviction that Briggs' 
"access to the computer was not 'without authorization' within the 
[plain] meaning of the statute."112 "Authorization" was not defined in 
the statute, but, applying dictionary definitions, the court concluded 
that the initial grant of access ended the inquiry: employees who had 
permission "to 'instruct,' 'communicate with,' 'store data in,' or 're-
trieve data from'" a computer system were authorized within the 
meaning of the statute and subject to no implied limits on their au-
thority.113 The court noted that 
[t)he legislative history supports our reading of the statute. In 1984, in an 
apparent response to the inadequacies of current criminal law to address dis-
ruptive or voyeuristic acts involving computer information systems, House 
Bill 121, approved by both houses, and enacted as Chapter 588, 1984 Laws of 
Maryland, criminalized "illegal access to computers." A representative of the 
Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning testified in support of the bill: 
Generally speaking, the threat [of computer crime) may be viewed as being 
divided into two reasonably identifiable types: 1) those associated with crimi-
nal intent or activity, and 2) those associated with the so called "hacker" type 
105. ld. 
106. The full text of the statute under which Briggs was charged is set forth supra 
note 102. Briggs was also charged with theft, but acquitted of those charges. 
Briggs, 704 A.2d at 906 n.3. 
107. Briggs, 704 A.2d at 906. 
108. !d. The court sentenced Briggs to one year of incarceration, with all but two days 
suspended, two years supervised probation, 150 hours of community service, and 
a fine of $500. The court also ordered him to cooperate with Scarborough and 
required him to release any remaining password information and client files. ld. 
109. The verdict was appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Ma· 
ryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own motion before consideration 
by the Court of Special Appeals. /d. 
110. ld. at 907. 
111. ld. 
112. Id. at 908. 
113. Id. at 910. 
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of activity, where just the challenge of penetrating the system, or some sort of 
"electronic vandalism" or other mischief is the objective. While outright crimi-
nal activity involving information systems is covered by current statute, the 
Department feels this bill provides a needed addition by directly addressing 
the second type of threat by prohibiting all unauthorized access, for whatever 
purpose, and by providing penalties for its occurrence.114 
Therefore, the court concluded, 
The legislative history thus suggests that House Bill 121 was drafted in reac-
tion to the concern about the recent "hacker" activity. The Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee Report for House Bill 121, reported favorably by 
Chairman (now President of the Senate) Thomas V. Mike Miller, underscores 
our conclusion that the statute should apply to those who break into com-
puters: ... "This legislation is intended to make it a misdemeanor for a person 
intentionally and without authorization to access, attempt to access or cause 
access to a computer system. The purpose of the bill is to deter individuals 
from breaking into computer systems."ll5 
The court then invited the legislature to broaden the statute if it 
intended the law to apply to cases such as Briggs.116 In 2002 the leg-
islature accepted the court's ·invitation, amending the statute117 to 
provide that "(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and with-
out authorization access, attempt to access, cause to be accessed, or 
exceed the person's authorized access to all or part of a computer net-
work, computer control language, computer, computer software, com-
puter system, computer services, or computer database."us 
The Maryland statute defines "computer" as "an electronic, mag-
netic, optical, organic, or other data processing device or system that 
performs logical, arithmetic, memory, or storage functions."119 It de-
fines a "computer network" as "the interconnection of one or more 
114. ld. (citation omitted). 
115. Id. at 910-11 (citation omitted). 
116. See id. at 911 ("If the law is to be broadened to include Briggs's conduct, it should 
be modified by the Legislature, not by this Court."). 
117. This amendment is now found at Mo. ConE ANN., CRrM. LAw§ 7-302 (LexisNexis 
2005). 
118. Id. § 7-302(c)(1) (emphasis added). The complete text of the current section 7-
302(c) provides as follows: 
(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization 
access, attempt to access, cause to be accessed, or exceed the person's 
authorized access to all or part of a computer network, computer control 
language, computer, computer software, computer system, computer ser-
vices, or computer database. 
(2) A person may not commit an act prohibited by paragraph (1) of this 
subsection with the intent to: 
(i) cause the malfunction or interrupt the operation of all or any part of a 
computer, computer network, computer control language, computer 
software, computer system, computer services, or computer data; or 
(ii) alter, damage, or destroy all or any part of data or a computer pro-
gram stored, maintained, or produced by a computer, computer network, 
computer software, computer system, computer services, or computer 
database. 
119. Id. § 7-302 (a)(4)(i). 
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computers through: (i) the use of a satellite, microwave, line, or other 
communication medium; and (ii) terminals or a complex consisting of 
two or more interconnected computers regardless of whether the inter-
connection is continuously maintained."120 It defines a "computer sys-
tem" as "one or more connected or unconnected computers, peripheral 
devices, computer software, data, or computer programs."121 
Thus, the definitions of computer, computer system, and computer 
network are broad enough to encompass the client-server configura-
tion typically involved in web browsing, with the statute apparently 
specifically directed to Internet-type connections.122 
Given the history of the current statute, it would be difficult to ar-
gue that merely overstepping one's authority was not prohibited. Ma-
ryland's statutory revision was clearly a response to the Maryland 
Court of Appeals' decision in Briggs, and clearly intended to clarify the 
point that exceeding authority violates the statute. 
Therefore, under such statutes, the fact that a transaction giving 
rise to a cookie is initiated by the user will not protect the server's 
owner from liability if the user does not authorize the cookie itself. 
Setting the unauthorized cookie is a clear case of exceeding the scope 
of initially authorized access. 
The geographic reach of the Maryland statute is defined in subsec-
tion (f): "Venue.-A court of competent jurisdiction may try a person 
prosecuted under this section in any county in this State where: (1) 
the defendant performed the act; or (2) the accessed computer is 
located."123 
Thus, it is not necessary for the server to be located in Maryland; 
access by a Maryland user would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
Since the nature of the Internet prevents a server from determining 
(or verifying) the physical location of the client computer, the owner of 
any server which sets cookies is at risk. The factor determining liabil-
ity is not the location of the server, but the location of the client. 
C. Government Cookies: Searches and Takings? 
Government websites set cookies. There are specific guidelines for 
determining when it is appropriate for federal agencies to do so.124 
120. Id. § 7-302 (a)(7). 
121. Id. § 7-302 (a)(ll). 
122. See id. § 7-302(a)(7). 
123. Id. § 7-302(0. 
124. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INTERNET PRIVACY: IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF FEDERAL GuiDANCE FOR AGENCY UsE OF "CooKIEs" (2001). While the re-
ported uses of cookies on government websites have, to date, involved federal 
websites, the same issues would be posed by the use of cookies by state or local 
governments or agencies. 
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The information placed by government cookies can be used to track 
what information is being requested by particular users. The Office of 
Management and Budget, in its June 1, 1999 Guidance125 noted that 
persistent cookies126 raised "serious concerns" because they made it 
"technically easy" for the agency to learn the complete history of users' 
web activity.127 Following the same logic as developed in Part III, au-
thorization to engage in a web-based transaction is not equivalent to 
authorization to set a cookie, or to read one that has previously been 
set. Particularly since the government can aggregate all of the infor-
mation contained in cookies set by any government website, it has the 
ability to produce a composite image of an individual. 
Arguably, as in the corporate context, what takes place is an ex-
change of access in return for user information. The government, 
however, is a special type of provider of information and in a special 
situation with respect to obtaining information from its citizens. 
The extent to which the government may require surrender of a 
right other than through eminent domain has been analyzed by the 
Supreme Court in a series of cases starting with the Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co. trade secret case.12s A trade secret is information that 
derives independent economic value from not being generally known 
or readily ascertainable by proper means, where its owner takes rea-
sonable steps under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.129 
Trade secrets are violated by misappropriation: unauthorized access 
to, use of, or disclosure of trade secrets obtained by improper 
means.130 Trade secret law protects the information; the medium of 
storage is irrelevant, and courts have specifically found data stored in 
computers to qualifY for trade secret protection.131 
If the information stored in cookies is viewed as a trade secret of 
the computer owner, three consequences follow. First, unauthorized 
access to, use of, or disclosure of such information is a misappropria-
tion of the trade secret.132 Second, unauthorized use or disclosure of 
such information by a government is a taking.133 And finally, unau-
thorized access to such information by a government may constitute 
an unlawful search and seizure under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
125. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 11. 
126. These are cookies which were stored on a user's computer beyond the web brows-
ing session in which they were set. See discussion supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text. 
127. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 11. 
128. 467 u.s. 986 (1984). 
129. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
130. Id. 
131. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986. 
132. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
133. See discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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It is clear that the superficial transaction-the request for infor-
mation and receipt of the response-is authorized. The deeper issue is 
whether the government can require authorization of cookies in order 
to obtain access to the requested information. 
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court specifically addressed whether 
the government's use of trade secret information constituted a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.l34 Monsanto had submitted proprietary 
data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to obtain 
permission to market a compound regulated by the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).l35 Under EPA regula-
tions, the agency was permitted to use Monsanto's proprietary data in 
evaluating submissions for similar compounds submitted by Mon-
santo's competitors. While the EPA might have compelled Monsanto 
to make the data available to competitors through eminent domain, 
the Fifth Amendment would require payment of ''just compensa-
tion,"136 and instead the agency chose to rely on the argument that 
the data had been voluntarily submitted and could be used for any 
authorized regulatory purpose. The Court held that trade secrets 
were property137 subject to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, 
and that their use by the government triggered the right to just com-
pensation. Although the Court found an adequate remedy that al-
lowed avoiding enjoining the use,138 it did deal with the question 
whether Monsanto's voluntary submission of the data in order to ob-
tain the required EPA license constituted a waiver of the constitu-
tional protection.139 While noting that there was "no set formula" and 
that courts must look to the particular circumstances of each case,140 
the Court held that since Monsanto was "aware of the conditions 
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally 
related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of 
data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a 
registration can hardly be called a taking."141 The valuable benefit 
134. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1004. 
135. 7 u.s.c. § 136 (2000). 
136. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
137. The information qualified as a trade secret under the relevant state Jaw (Mis-
souri). Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003. Thus, not only does Monsanto bear on the 
"access in exchange for information" question, but also on the question whether 
information as to a user's browsing route is a protectable property right. 
138. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016. 
139. There was also an issue as to information submitted under old regulations which 
did not explicitly state that the EPA would use the data in evaluating competi-
tors' applications. As to these, the Court held that there was a taking. See Mon-
santo, 467 U.S. at 1009. 
140. ld. at 1005 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). 
141. Id. at 1007. 
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which Monsanto received in return for the use of its proprietary data 
included a term of exclusive license to use its compound and the right 
to compensation from competitors who wished to rely on Monsanto's 
data.142 
At the other end of the spectrum, in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission,143 a state refused to grant a permit to improve existing 
beachfront property unless the owner dedicated a public easement.144 
While the dissent would have considered the grant of a permit a bene-
fit akin to that in Monsanto,145 the majority disagreed, stating that 
"the announcement that the application for (or granting of) the permit 
w[ould] entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as 
establishing the voluntary 'exchange' that we found to have occurred 
in Monsanto."146 The Nollan Court explained that the ability to im-
prove one's own property, though subject to some regulation, is not 
comparable to the type of government benefit proffered in exchange 
for use and disclosure of trade secret information in Monsanto.147 
Thus, Nollan recognizes that the mere granting of permission to en-
gage in routine activities, incident to existing rights, does not consti-
tute compensation sufficient to support a Monsanto-type exchange. 
Likewise, in Philip Morris Inc. v. Reilly,14B Massachusetts had re-
quired tobacco companies to submit proprietary information in order 
to continue doing business in the Commonwealth. The court found no 
exchange which compensated Philip Morris: allowing a company to 
continue to do business did riot provide the required benefit under 
Monsanto.149 
It is therefore unlikely that a government could avoid the taking 
requirements simply by arguing that a user of its website had volunta-
rily surrendered its rights (even if the government provides notice 
that cookies are being used). As in Philip Morris, the user is only ac-
cessing data it already has the right to access. Unlike Monsanto, no 
special benefit is conferred on a specific user in exchange for access to 
the information. 
D. Accessory/Secondary Liability 
Cases analyzing secondary liability for third-party actions in civil 
contexts provide insight into whether providers of software which fa-
142. See id.; Philip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1081-82 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(discussing Monsanto). 
143. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
144. See id. at 828. 
145. See id. at 860 n.lO (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 833 n.2 (majority opinion) (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007). 
147. Id. 
148. 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1082 (1st Cir. 2002). 
149. See id. 
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cilitates setting cookies without authorization should face secondary 
liability. Two Supreme Court cases have focused on liabilityi50 of 
providers of enabling technology: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Jnc.I51 and MGM v. Grokster.l52 
Under Sony, it would be difficult to impose secondary liability on 
the producers ofweb browsers predicated on the use of those browsers 
to violate the rights of others. The Sony decision exonerated Sony 
from liability for the manufacture of videorecorders, even though the 
videorecorders could be used (and were shown to have been widely 
used) to violate the rights of copyright holders,l53 because the vide-
orecorders were also capable of substantial uses which did not violate 
the rights of copyright holders.l54 
Analyzing the theory of liability for actions of others (in Sony, lia-
bility for contributory copyright infringement committed by third-
party users of Sony's videorecorders), the Supreme Court held that the 
sale of videotape recorders, 
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
poses. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not ex-
plore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or 
not they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only consider 
whether on the basis of the facts as found by the District Court a significant 
number of them would be noninfringing.l55 
At the time that the Sony case reached the Supreme Court, no stat-
ute imposed secondary liability for facilitating violation of a copyright 
owner's rights.l56 However, the Sony court noted 
the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not pre-
clude the imposition ofliability ... on certain parties who have not themselves 
150. Both cases were civil cases based on secondary liability for alleged violations of 
copyright. The copyright statute also has provisions imposing criminal liability. 
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000). 
151. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
152. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
153. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. 
154. ld. 
155. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Betamax was Sony's brand of videotape recorder at the 
time; it used a proprietary recording format (Beta), which Sony no longer 
produces. 
156. "The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement com-
mitted by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who 'ac-
tively induces infringement of a patent' as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), and 
further imposes liability on ... 'contributory' infringers,§ 271(c)." Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 434--35. The Copyright Statute now does impose secondary liability in one 
particular circumstance: 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) prohibits inducing or knowingly caus-
ing infringement of semiconductor designs and raises questions as to whether the 
judicially created concept of secondary liability in the copyright act was implicitly 
narrowed by passage of this specific statutory statement of secondary liability. 
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engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtu· 
ally all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is 
merely a species of the broader problem of identifYing the circumstances in 
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of 
another.l57 
Traditionally, secondary liability for copyright infringement has 
been divided into two categories: contributory infringement and vica-
rious infringement.I58 Contributory infringement liability is imposed 
upon "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other."I59 Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is imposed 
upon a party who, while not directly committing infringement, facili-
tates infringement by another whom the vicariously liable party has 
"the right and ability to supervise [which] coalesce[s] with an obvious 
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
materials."l60 
Since Sony-type vicarious liability requires either control over the 
primary infringer or financial benefit from the infringement, a defen-
157. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
158. It is arguable .that the Sony decision does not observe the traditional definitions 
in its use of the terms "contributory liability" and "vicarious liability." "[T]he 
[Sony] Court [treated] vicarious and contributory infringement interchangeably." 
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 & n.17). 
159. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). Columbia Artists Management (CAMI) promoted a 
local community concert association that in turn sponsored a concert in which 
copyrighted musical compositions were performed without permission. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment against CAM!, stating that by "organiz-
ing, supervising, and controlling" the local association, and by "knowingly 
participat[ing]" in the association's infringing activity, CAM! caused the infringe-
ment. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581, 
583 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Second Circuit affirmed: 
With knowledge that its artists included copyrighted compositions in 
their performances, CAMI created the ... audience as a market for those 
artists. CAMI's pervasive participation in the formation and direction of 
this association and its programming of compositions presented amply 
support the district court's finding that it "caused th[e] copyright 
infringement." 
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (quoting Gershwin, 312 F. Supp. at 583). 
160. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(holding a department store vicariously liable for copyright infringement by its 
record sales concessionaire). See also Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding dance hall vicariously liable 
for copyright infringement committed by the orchestra it had hired); KECA Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (holding cocktail 
lounge vicariously liable for infringement by musicians who played background 
music); cf Artists Music Inc. v. Reed Publ'g Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (holding that landlord who received the same rent regardless of the profits 
earned by its tenant and who could not control the infringing activity on the 
premises was not vicariously liable for infringement by its tenant). 
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dant may escape liability by showing the lack of either. In addition, 
under Sony, a defense (imported from patent law) is available to sec-
ondary copyright defendants.161 The exact nature of the defense is 
susceptible to at least four readings of the standard: 
[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of sub· 
stantial noninfringing uses. The question is thus whether the Betamax is ca· 
pable of commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that 
question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine 
and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement. Rather, 
we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the Dis-
trict Court a significant number of them would be noninfringing.l62 
As technology advanced, subsequent cases considered the argu-
ment that providing software that facilitates widespread violations of 
rights could impose secondary liability on the provider of the software, 
with a split in the circuits over the correct reading of the Sony stan-
dard. For example, the Seventh Circuit found secondary infringement 
for facilitating peer-to-peer file sharing,163 while the Ninth Circuit 
found such activities insufficient to impose secondary liability.164 
Manufacturers of web browsers could not face secondary liability 
under any reading of the Sony standard, because web browser 
software clearly has significant uses which do not infringe user's 
rights. However, in 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Groksterl65 to resolve the conflict between the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits' interpretations of Sony. MGM complained that software distrib-
uted by Grokster facilitated peer-to-peer transfer of files over the 
161. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court stated, 
I d. 
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a 
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely sym-
bolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others 
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accord-
ingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product 
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need 
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
162. Id. (emphasis added to identify the possible ways to read the standard). For a 
suggested interpretation that harmonizes the four possible readings, see Max 
Stu! Oppenheimer, Yours for Keeps: MGM v. Grokster, J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 209 n.96 (2005). 
163. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1107 (2004). Aimster was not a primary infringer; "because copies of the songs 
reside on the computers of the users and not on Aimster's own server, Aimster is 
not a direct infringer of the copyrights on those songs. Its function is similar to 
that of a stock exchange, which is a facility for matching offers rather than a 
repository of the things being exchanged ... ." I d. at 646-4 7. 
164. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
165. 543 u.s. 1032 (2004). 
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Internet in violation of its copyrights.166 MGM did not allege that 
Grokster had committed direct copyright infringement, but instead ar-
gued that Grokster was secondarily liable for enabling massive copy-
right infringement.167 
The Court was unable to reach a majority decision on the Sony is-
sue168 and instead turned to a different basis for secondary liability: 
inducement.169 The Grokster Court held that the basis of Grokster's 
liability was not limited to interpretations of Sony; the Sony decision 
"did not displace other theories of secondary liability,"170 and secon-
dary liability based on inducement could be established by showing 
"intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a device suita-
ble for infringing use" plus "evidence of actual infringement by recipi-
ents of the device."171 The Court found it significant that the 
defendants had not attempted to design their product so as to mini-
mize the risk that it would be used to infringe others' rights.172 
Browsers are set to accept cookies by default. This facilitates the 
widespread violation of users' rights. Unlike Sony, under Grokster, 
there can be secondary liability if a product facilitates a violation and 
the producer has not attempted to design it so as to minimize the risk 
of that violation. This may well be enough to run afoul of the Grokster 
standard. It would be a simple matter to set the defaults on browser 
software to reject cookies. Why, then, have the producers of browser 
software chosen to set the defaults to accept cookies? It would be diffi-
cult to construct an argument that would provide an alternative to the 
166. The plaintiffs alleged that they "own the copyrights in most of the material in-
fringed on Grokster and StreamCast, and they are the only copyright owners 
with sufficient resources and incentives to litigate effectively against respon-
dents." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-
480). 
167. MGM, in its petition for writ of certiori, alleged that "[m]ore than 2.6 billion in-
fringing music files are downloaded each month," and that "between 400,000 and 
600,000 copies of motion pictures are unlawfully downloaded each day." ld. at 8. 
168. Compare concurring opinion of Justices Ginsburg, Rehnquist, and Kennedy, 
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring; with Rehnquist, C.J., Ken-
nedy, J.), with id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring; with Stevens and O'Connor, 
J.J.). 
169. The "inducement" standard adopted by the Court was not argued by any of the 
parties, but was suggested in an amicus brief filed by Senators Leahy and Hatch. 
Brief Amici Curiae of United States Senator Patrick Leahy & United States Sen-
ator Orrin G. Hatch in Support of Neither Party at 13, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 
(No. 04-480) (stating that Sony "explicitly and deliberately left aside liability 
based on inducement" (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19)). 
170. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (plurality opinion). 
171. ld. at 2782. 
172. I d. at 2781 ("[The] evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by 
MGM's showing that neither [defendant] attempted to develop filtering tools or 
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software .... 
[W]e think this evidence underscores Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional fa-
cilitation of their users' infringement.") 
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obvious conclusion that business considerations drove the decision 
and that the manufacturers intended to bring about the result that 
servers could set cookies without clients' knowing authorization. 
V. WHOSE LAW? WHOSE COURTS? 
It is convenient to think of Internet transactions as taking place in 
"cyberspace." To date, however, cyberspace does not have a court sys-
tem, so it is necessary to decide which of the existing courts can assert 
personal jurisdiction over parties who engage in transactions not tied 
to a specific physical location. Conceptually, there are arguable dis-
tinctions between transactions which a defendant has chosen to initi-
ate173 and those which the defendant has chosen to accommodate, but 
which the plaintiff initiated.174 
While the analysis of these two types of transactions might differ, 
the constitutional framework is the same. Jurisdiction must be based 
on statutory authority and constitutional due process.175 The statu-
tory authority is typically provided by a long-arm statute, conferring 
jurisdiction over parties transacting business or causing injury in the 
forum state. 
The fundamental constitutional test for jurisdiction is whether the 
defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum jurisdiction "such 
that the maintenance ofthe suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."'176 Factors which have entered into 
the determination include: 
1. Whether the defendant "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state."177 Jurisdic-
tion lies when a defendant has "'purposefully directed' his 
activities at residents of the forum."178 In particular, jurisdiction 
is proper in the state where the injury occurs if the defendant 
placed the injurious products in "the stream of commerce with the 
173. An example would be an e-mail sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. A further 
distinction could be drawn between transactions which the defendant chose to 
initiate with the specific plaintiff, and those which the defendant initiated with 
multiple parties (of whom the defendant was one) but without a specific intent to 
contact the specific defendant (e.g., spam). 
174. An example would be a website, owned by the defendant, which set cookies with-
out explicit permission of the plaintiff. Technically, the transaction would be ini-
tiated by the plaintiffs decision to visit the defendant's website. Conceptually, 
the plaintiffs website might be viewed as an attractive nuisance. 
175. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
176. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
177. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
178. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
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expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the fo-
rum State;"179 
2. Whether the claim arose out of the defendant's activity in the fo-
rum state;lBO 
3. Whether the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court" in the forum state;lBl and 
4. The state's interest and "fairness" to the parties.182 
State courts have disagreed on whether sending an e-mail is sufficient 
to establish jurisdiction in the recipient's state. An Arkansas court 
has held it sufficient,183 while a Utah court has held it insufficient.184 
Maintaining an Internet site does not require the same specific de-
cision to contact the forum state as does sending an e-mail. Although 
it might well fall within the reasoning of World- Wide Volkswagen that 
its contents are being placed in commerce with the knowledge that 
they might enter the forum state and cause injury, cases have held 
that merely maintaining a website which is accessed by a user in an-
other jurisdiction is insufficient contact with the user's state to estab-
lish jurisdiction.185 It is easy to see the practical reason why the two 
categories should lead to different results-otherwise, every website 
owner would be subject to jurisdiction in every state. 
179. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). 
180. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant requires contacts with the forum state that 
are "continuous and systematic"); see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 
220 (1957) (the least contact with the forum state that the Supreme Court has 
allowed is one contact). 
181. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
182. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
183. Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724 (Ark. 2003) (relying on ARK. CoDE ANN. § 5-27-
304(a) (1997), which made it illegal to ship child pornography into the state). 
184. Fenn v. MLeads Enter., Inc., 137 P.3d 706 (Utah 2006). The Fenn court found 
specific personal jurisdiction improper as violative of the due process clause 
where plaintiff, a Utah resident, received one unsolicited advertising e-mail with-
out "ADV:" in the subject line as required by the Utah Unsolicited Commercial 
and Sexually Explicit Email Act, where defendant did not know specifically that 
its agent would send an e-mail to plaintiff or to any Utah resident and where 
plaintiff did not allege any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary damages. 
The intermediate appellate court had noted, "[T]his issue is a matter of first im-
pression in Utah and, as far as our research has revealed, in all of the United 
States." Fenn v. MLeads Enter., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
There had already been other cases involving jurisdiction in the case of e-mail, 
but they involved massive e-mailings and the question of whether jurisdiction 
was proper where the ISP maintained the computer which handled the e-mails. 
Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002); In-
ternet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Washing-
ton v. Heckel, 93 P.3d 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Of course, the fact that thee-
mails were sent by an agent would be no defense under traditional principles of 
respondeat superior. 
185. Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
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Plaintiffs seeking to bring federal class actions have typically ad-
vanced multiple theories, including federal statutory, state statutory, 
and common law claims, but federal courts have been reluctant to re-
tain jurisdiction when the federal claims have been dismissed. 
Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.186 presents a typical complaint. There, the 
plaintiffs alleged that they had used the Internet, visited websites, 
and had an Avenue A "cookie" placed on their computers, thus permit-
ting Avenue A to monitor their electronic communications without 
their knowledge, authorization, or consent. They moved for class cer-
tification to include tens of millions of Internet users, alleging viola-
tions of the federal Wiretap Act,187 the Stored Communications 
Act,IBB the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,189 common law (invasion 
of privacy, trespass, and unjust enrichment), and Washington statutes 
prohibiting wiretapping and deceptive and unfair business practices. 
The court dismissed the federal statutory claims on definitional 
grounds190 and, as a matter of discretion, declined to maintain supple-
mental jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action, which it 
characterized as "novel and complex."191 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
The problems described above arise when there is a confluence of 
four conditions: (1) browsers are set to accept cookies by default; (2) 
server owners choose to set cookies; (3) some users are unaware of the 
fact that cookies are being set; and (4) a statute (which defines unlaw-
ful access sufficiently broadly to encompass setting cookies) prohibits 
unauthorized access to a computer. Removing any one of these condi-
tions would insulate against criminal liability. 
If browsers were set to deny cookies by default, then cookies could 
only be set if the user took a conscious step to enable them. This 
would constitute authorization under any of the statutes currently in 
force. If the cookie has been knowingly authorized, the issue of ex-
ceeding access authority disappears.192 
186. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
187. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Com-
munications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
188. Id. § 2701(a). 
189. Id. § 1030. 
190. The plaintiffs failed to meet the CFAA requirement of $5,000 damages from a 
single act or event. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-59. The court found suffi-
cient authorization to avoid liability under the ECPA, and that the Wiretap Act 
did not apply because one party to the transaction had consented. 
191. Id. at 1163. 
192. The default would need to be set on a user-by-user basis or the authorization 
argument would fail. The problem of a user who is computer literate but legally 
incompetent-a relatively common situation-would remain. However, most 
statutes explicitly require knowingly unauthorized access as an element of the 
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Owners of websites can avoid liability by acquiring authorization 
broad enough to cover setting cookies.193 There are a number of ways 
to accomplish this, such as providing conspicuous notice that the web-
site is using cookies and a description of the information being stored. 
If users were to proceed with such knowledge,194 the access to their 
computers would be authorized. Elementary contract law provides 
that authorization can be manifested by action and that formalities 
are not required.195 This could be accomplished through a formal con-
tract, entered into as part of the relationship (for example, where the 
user is a subscriber to a service). Authorization could also be ob-
tained, however, by less formal means.196 
A conspicuous notice on the home webpage stating that cookies are 
used and identifying what information is stored for how long should be 
sufficient, especially if coupled with the requirement of some action by 
the user indicating an understanding of the site's cookie policy. Again, 
this establishes authority (and follows the European Union's directive 
approach). In the future, if knowledge of the use of cookies were to 
become so widespread as to presume authorization, notice on a specific 
website might no longer be necessary. 
Finally, the statutes could be changed. Given the range of state 
statutory standards and the reach of state statutes (governing trans-
actions which involve a computer within their borders, regardless of 
the location of the website server), website owners and hosts would 
offense, and those which are not explicit would likely be interpreted to require 
intent. See supra section IV.B. 
193. There is, of course, another way to avoid liability: avoid the use of cookies. 
194. This assumes the users are competent. The special problems of dealing with par-
ties who are not competent is beyond the scope of this Article. 
195. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) ("We recognize 
that contract offers on the Internet often require the offeree to click on an 'I agree' 
icon. And no doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agreement by 
the offeree is essential to the formation of a contract. But not in all circum-
stances. While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new 
situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is stan-
dard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, 
and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms 
of the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly 
become binding on the offeree." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 
69 (1)(a) (1981)). But see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com., Inc., CV99-7654-
HLH(VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (apparently 
turning on the lack of an "I agree" button to signifY assent). 
196. Such means would, of course, need to meet the ordinary contract law require-
ments of offer and knowing acceptance. For example, in Specht v. Netscape Com-
munications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), the court declined to enforce 
arbitration terms relating to Netscape's software because it was not clear that 
users downloading the software had necessarily seen the terms. The terms were 
posted on the website from which the user downloaded Netscape's software, but 
would not be seen unless the user scrolled down beyond the point where they 
could download the software. 
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benefit from a unified set of rules. While the owners of websites may 
initially be tempted to opt for the quick fix of a federal statute "immu-
nizing" the use of cookies from liability, passage of such a statute 
would require overcoming clear public opposition.197 Such a crude ap-
proach, however, is not needed. What is needed is a unified approach 
to jurisdiction, to eliminate the uncertainty of multiple state laws ap-
plying to the same transaction, plus such simple steps as notification 
in order to comply with the mainstream definition of consent. In-
ternet transactions are clearly interstate commerce and Congress has 
repeatedly used its Commerce Clause power to regulate the In-
ternet.198 It could use that power to establish a unified national stan-
dard for obtaining permission to set cookies. This is not an area where 
the federalist principle of allowing state experimentation is appropri-
ate, nor is it an area in which varying community standards might 
justify different rules in different communities. It is an area in which 
broad education and unified standards would benefit both users and 
website owners. 
197. In the 2000 Business Week poll, see Harris Interactive, supra note 100, fifty-seven 
percent of the respondents felt that "the government should pass laws now for 
how personal information can be collected and used on the Internet." It is clear 
from the balance of the poll results, see supra note 100 and accompanying text; 
see also infra appendix, that the laws they have in mind are not ones that would 
foster growth of cookie use without consent. 
198. While Congress struggles to find a constitutional way of regulating speech on the 
Internet, its early attempts-the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104 § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 
(2002)), and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)-
failed not for lack of congressional authority over the Internet, but for impact on 
free speech. The problem is one of drafting, not power. 
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APPENDIX 
The following raw data was collected by a telephone survey of 
1,014 adults between March 2 and March 6, 2000, by Harris 
Interactive: 199 
If you use a computer, have you ever heard of an online technology known as 
"cookies"? 
Yes 40 
No 60 
If you have heard of cookies, which of the following best describes your under-
standing of what they are? 
Files downloaded onto your computer that track your online habits 75 
A hacker who breaks the security of private computer systems 5 
The telephone number used to dial into an online service 4 
The place where e-mail is stored indefinitely 3 
Don't know 12 
If you have heard of cookies, how often do you set your computer to reject 
them? 
Always 21 
Sometimes 21 
Rarely 10 
Never 43 
Don't know 5 
Some Web sites track personal information to match users with products and 
services that meet their needs. Other Web sites profit by sharing or selling user 
information to other organizations. If you use the Internet, how comfortable would 
you be if a Web site did the following? 
Very Somewhat Not Very Not At All Not 
Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Sure 
Tracked your movements when you browsed the site, but didn't tie that 
information to your name or real-world identity 
9 28 28 35 * 
Merged your browsing habits and shopping patterns into a profile that was 
linked to your real name and identity 
3 7 21 68 1 
Created a profile of you that included your real name and identity as well as 
additional personal information such as your income, driver's license, credit 
data, and medical status 
3 2 13 82 0 
How comfortable would you be if a Web site did the following? 
Very Somewhat Not Very Not At All Not 
Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Sure 
Tracked your movements when you browsed the site, but didn't tie that 
information to your name or real-world identity 
9 28 28 35 * 
Shared your information with other organizations 
1 6 25 67 * 
Sold your information to other organizations 
1 5 19 74 * 
Shared information so you could be tracked on multiple Web sites 
1 7 24 67 0-
199. Harris Interactive, supra note 100. 
